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  INTRODUCTION   
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”),1 
America’s primary federal labor law, was originally enacted as 
part of New Deal legislation in 1935, for the purpose of secur-
ing workers’ “right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities.”2 With the exception of the Health Care Amend-
ments in 1974, only two major amendments have been made to 
the NLRA since its inception: one in 1947 through the Taft-
Hartley Act3
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ty Law, class of 2013) for invaluable research assistance, and to Harry John-
son, Paul Secunda, David S. Sherwyn, and Joseph E. Slater for their helpful 
feedback and suggestions. Copyright © 2014 by Zev J. Eigen & Sandro 
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 and one in 1959 by way of the Landrum-Griffin 
 1. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). This statutory provision, which spells out a set 
of rights now commonly known as “Section 7” rights, along with Section 8 of 
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), which prohibits unfair labor practices by employ-
ers, constitutes the core of the Wagner Act. 
 3. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197). The Taft-Hartley Act 
was enacted in an attempt to even the playing field between unions and em-
ployers at a time when unions had grown strong and widespread criticism had 
arisen over the NLRA’s seemingly one-sided favoritism of unions in the collec-
tive bargaining process. See Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Rela-
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Act.4 Since 1959, the text of the Act has remained essentially 
unchanged, except for certain structural changes that apply on-
ly to health care institutions.5 During the intervening time pe-
riod, the nature of work, the composition of the American work-
force, and the laws and regulations governing employee rights 
and employer obligations in the workplace have changed mark-
edly.6
 
tions Act Was Stolen and How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism 
and the National Labor Relations Board's Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21–22 (2012). The primary substantive revisions imposed 
by the Act were regulatory restrictions on union activity. See id. at 22–23.  
 Commentators have long expressed concern over labor 
law’s failure to adapt to a changing economy and called for re-
 4. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act 
of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.) (adding provisions spelling out the rights of union members 
and imposing regulations on internal union affairs, and making relatively mi-
nor revisions to existing labor-management provisions of the Act).  
 5. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1532–33 (2002). Only minor changes have been made to 
the Act since 1959, including a 1970 revision expanding the Act’s coverage to 
include the U.S. Postal Service, Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 
84 Stat. 719, at 737 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 1209 (2012)), and a 
1974 amendment applicable only to healthcare institutions, Act of July 26, 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, at 395–96 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 152(14), 158(d) (2012)). 
 6. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1535–36 (describing an increasingly di-
verse workforce, a shift away from the manufacturing industry, technological 
developments affecting the nature of work, and changes in production methods 
and organizational structure); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 
1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 375, 375 n.4 (2007) (commenting that the NLRA “has 
proven remarkably inept in responding to changes in the composition of the 
U.S. labor force, and now entirely excludes from its coverage contingent work-
ers, ‘knowledge’ workers, and undocumented immigrant workers, precisely 
those segments of the workforce that increasingly define the labor market”). 
For a discussion of state law developments affecting the rights of individual 
workers, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: 
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collec-
tive Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 591–93 (1992). On a national 
level, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 651–678 (21012) (establishing minimum health and safety standards for 
the workplace), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1146 (2012) (establishing minimum standards for 
pension plans in the private sector), the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(4) (2012) (requiring employers to offer unpaid 
leave for certain family and medical reasons), and the Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2012) 
(requiring qualifying employers to provide advance notice of plant closings and 
mass layoffs), have all expanded the basic rights of employees entering into 
employment contracts. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The 
NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 228 n.32 (2005). 
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forms that would allow the NLRA to better meet the needs of 
individuals, employers, and organized labor.7
While several attempts at significant labor law reform 
have been made, those efforts have so far failed.
  
8 Even those 
attempts at legislative reform that were able to garner majority 
support in both Houses of Congress were ultimately defeated 
by well-organized minorities in the Senate.9 In 1977, Congress 
introduced the pro-union Labor Reform Act,10 which proposed 
several provisions aimed at deterring employer misconduct and 
reducing the perceived advantages of employers in union or-
ganizing campaigns gained as a result of their superior access 
to and influence over employees and the workplace.11 The Labor 
Reform Act passed in the House, only to be defeated following a 
five-week Republican filibuster in the Senate.12 During the 
Clinton Administration, the Cesar Chavez Work-place Fairness 
Act,13 which sought to prohibit employers from firing striking 
employees, met a similar fate—defeated by an anti-union mi-
nority in the Senate.14 In 1995, the Republican-backed Team-
work for Employees and Managment Act (TEAM Act),15
 
 7. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE 
OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 9 (1993); Estlund, supra note 
 aimed 
at amending the NLRA to permit employer-sponsored alterna-
5; Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening 
Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996); 
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for 
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993); Joel Rogers, Reforming 
U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97 (1993); Sachs, supra note 6; 
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization 
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983). 
 8. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 5, at 1540 (describing significant failed 
attempts from the late-1970s and early-1990s). 
 9. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 228–29 (“[E]ach [legislative attempt] 
garnered majority support from both houses of Congress, but in the end each 
succumbed to the supermajority requirements of the U.S. Senate.”); Estlund, 
supra note 5, at 1540–41 (summarizing several failed legislative attempts at 
labor law reform). 
 10. S. 1883, 95th Cong. (1977). The proposed reforms included a shortened 
union election period, increased penalties against employers for engaging in 
anti-union activity barred by the NLRA, and greater access to workplaces for 
union organizers. 
 11. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1540. 
 12. See id. 
 13. H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 14. See Morris, supra note 3, at 13 n.41. 
 15. S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995). 
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tives to union representation, was defeated upon Congress’s 
failure to override President Clinton’s veto.16
Most recently, the Obama Administration proposed the 
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA),
  
17 which would have funda-
mentally changed the process of union recognition. The EFCA 
would have required employers to recognize a union as the ex-
clusive representative of its employees for collective bargaining 
purposes if the majority of employees signed “authorization 
cards” stating that they wished to be represented by the peti-
tioning union.18 As a matter of practice, this process would all 
but replace the traditional method by which unions petition the 
NLRB19 for the opportunity to hold a secret-ballot election dur-
ing which both the employer and the union typically have an 
opportunity to campaign for votes and employees cast ballots 
for or against union representation.20 Additional provisions of 
the EFCA would have increased penalties against employers 
that violated the NLRA21 and forced employers and unions to 
enter into binding arbitration if a collective agreement was not 
reached within 120 days of union recognition.22 Hopes of 
EFCA’s passing died in 2010—a result of unexpected changes 
in the party composition of the Senate—before the bill was 
brought to a formal vote in either House.23
Past reforms failed for one or both of the following reasons: 
(1) they were politically motivated, and therefore politically po-
larizing; or (2) they were outcome-focused, designed either to 
bolster union membership and power or to minimize it, instead 
of process- or fairness-oriented. Each of the attempts at legisla-
tive reform discussed in the preceding paragraphs illustrates 
the near-impossibility of enacting labor law reforms that are 
one-sided and partisan in origin. The highly organized nature 
  
 
 16. See Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Pleas from Business for Passage, 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (July. 31, 1996). 
 17. S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 18. Id. § 2. 
 19. The National Labor Relations Board is an independent agency estab-
lished by the NLRA to interpret and administer the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) 
(2012). 
 20. S. 560 § 2(a). 
 21. Id. § 4(b)(I). 
 22. Id. § 3. 
 23. See Richard D. Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvitd, "Architects of Democ-
racy": Labor Organizing as a Civil Right, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 222 
(2013) (citing the surprise election of a Republican to replace late Senator 
Kennedy of Massachusetts as the final blow to hope of passing the EFCA in 
the Senate). 
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of both the pro-union and the pro-employer/anti-union political 
contingents and a political system that permits a small minori-
ty to block majority-backed legislation combine to virtually 
guarantee that politically divisive and results-driven attempts 
at legislative reform of the NLRA will remain unsuccessful.24
Proposals for labor law reform have thus far typically rest-
ed upon normative assumptions regarding the value of unions 
in contemporary society. Pro-labor Democratic proposals, oper-
ating under the assumption that unionization is good for em-
ployees, strive to make it easier for unions to win elections and 
ultimately increase union membership. Union membership has 
decreased steadily over the past several decades, from its peak 
in the 1950s, when about 35% of the workforce was union-
represented,
 
Even if such reform could be pushed through Congress, the re-
sult would be a temporary, and possibly Pyrrhic, victory for one 
side, rather than a lasting solution to more deeply-rooted prob-
lems that have contributed to the NLRA’s failures. This Article 
argues that successful reform requires not just revision of sub-
stantive provisions of the NLRA, but a rethinking of the pro-
cess by which the Act is administered. 
25 to 11.3% in 2013.26 Currently only about 6.7% of 
private-sector employees are represented by unions.27 Pro-
union commentators and activists have pointed to this decline 
as an indication of a failure of the NLRA to serve its original 
purpose and to meet the evolving needs of the U.S. economy.28 
Pro-management, anti-union actors, on the other hand, fre-
quently ground their proposals—which seek to minimize the 
role of unions and make unionization less attainable—on the 
assumption that unions have withered because the American 
economy no longer needs them, essentially positing that unions 
generate inefficiencies that exacerbate economically unfavora-
ble conditions.29
 
 24. See Estlund, supra note 
 
5, at, 1542–44. 
 25. PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
NEW LABOR MARKET 46 (2001). 
 26. News Release, Bureau of Labor Stats., Union Members—2013 (Jan. 
24, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Un-
leashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 83, 97 (2009). 
 29. See id. It is worth noting another common source explanation of union 
decline—the growth of laws regulating the workplace based on individual 
rights, as opposed to collective rights. See Michael Piore & Sean Safford, 
Changing Regimes of Workplace Governance, Shifting Axes of Social Mobiliza-
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This Article suggests that labor law reform that focuses on 
the process by which the NLRA is administered is more politi-
cally and practically viable than approaches relying on assump-
tions about the value of unionization. Rather than using union-
ization rates or union election win-rates to measure the 
effectiveness of the NLRA and the fairness of labor law policy, 
this approach would judge the NLRA’s effectiveness by the 
fairness and stability of labor law decision-making and election 
processes.30
The reform proposed in this Article is founded on the belief 
that current problems with the NLRA are largely a result of the 
NLRB’s approach to deciding unfair labor practice cases. The 
Board’s approach is—some might say “notoriously”—marked by 
frequent shifts in precedent when the administration changes, 
combined with a policy of non-acquiescence with federal appel-
late court rulings until the Supreme Court ultimately decides 
an issue. In this regard, it is well-established that the NLRA 
empowers the Board to engage in both notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and adjudication of individual cases (subject to re-
view by the federal courts of appeal).
 Broadly, we propose excision of decision-making 
from NLRB jurisdiction on unfair labor practice charge cases 
alleging NLRA violations in favor of federal court decision-
making. Under this model the Board retains jurisdiction of 
what it does best: receiving and processing petitions involving 
questions concerning representation (QCR) and conducting un-
ion elections. In the performance of its QCR duties, the Board 
should be limited by an NLRA amendment to developing and 
implementing administrative guidance subject to judicial re-
view, not “legislative” (binding) rules subject to the Administra-
tive Procedures Act’s notice-and-comment requirements. 
31 However, the Board has 
historically opted to set policy almost entirely through the lat-
ter means, generally refusing to propagate concrete rules guid-
ing the interpretation of the NLRA.32
 
tion, and the Challenge to Industrial Relations Theory, 45 IND. REL. 299, 320 
(2006). 
 In the more than seventy-
 30. For a more in-depth discussion of this process-focused conception of 
fairness as it relates to union elections, see Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A 
Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 
708–13 (2012). 
 31. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292–95 (1974); NLRB 
v. Wyman-Gordan Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763–64, 772 (1969). 
 32. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 234. Several possible explanations have 
been offered for the NLRB’s strategy, among them that the rulemaking pro-
cess is time consuming and burdensome, adjudication allows for more frequent 
and less administratively burdensome adaptation of rules to new circum-
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five years since its inception the Board has successfully en-
gaged in legislative rulemaking on just a few occasions.33
This approach has led to a number of problems. First, the 
frequent shift in Board precedent following changes in the ad-
ministration has left employees, employers, and unions alike 
uncertain as to their rights and obligations under the NLRA. 
While caselaw may provide some guidance, adjudicative deci-
sions are fact-specific and thus may not be relied on to the 
same extent as broad, concrete rules. Second, adjudicative 
precedent under the NLRA has proven to be anything but sta-
ble. The Board has historically, beyond remand in specific cas-
es, defied appellate court decisions in other cases, refusing to 
defer to judicial precedent when not strictly required to do so.
  
34
 
stance, and adjudication attracts less critical oversight by Congress and the 
federal courts than formal rulemaking. See Brief for NLRB at 15, NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (No. 463), 1969 WL 1202891, at *15 
(commenting on the “Board's judgment that formal rule-making procedures 
are, as a general matter, too rigid and inflexible for most of the problems with 
which it is concerned”); Emily Baver, Comment, Setting Labor Policy Prospec-
tively: Rulemaking, Adjudicating, and What the NLRB Can Learn from the 
NMB's Representation Election Procedure Rule, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 853, 859–65 
(2011); Brudney, supra note 
 
Even more problematic is the fact that the NLRB frequently 
6, at 234–35. 
 33. In the early 1970s, the Board issued a series of rules clarifying juris-
diction standards for symphony orchestras and private colleges and universi-
ties, and declining jurisdiction over the horse racing industry. See 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 103.1–103.3 (2012). In 1989, the Board promulgated a rule defining bar-
gaining units in health care facilities. Appropriate Bargaining Units in the 
Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. § 103.30. More recently, the Board under the 
Obama Administration has made two attempts at substantive rulemaking. In 
2011, the Board issued a final rule which would require employers subject to 
the NLRA to post notices of employees’ rights under the Act at the workplace. 
Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, Fi-
nal Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,008 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 104). The rule’s validity has been challenged in federal courts, leading the 
NLRB to delay its effective date. See Employee Rights Notice Posting, NATION-
AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited Apr. 1, 
2014). An additional rule, Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 
80,138 (Dec. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pts. 101, 102, 103), which 
shortened the union election period went into effect in April of 2012 but was 
suspended after being struck down in federal court. See Press Release, NLRB, 
NLRB Suspends Implementation of Representation Case Amendments Based 
on Court Ruling (May 15, 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news 
-outreach/news-story/nlrb-suspends-implementation-representation-case 
-amendments-based-court. 
 34. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 237–38; Rebecca Hanner White, Time 
for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the “Law of the Cir-
cuit” When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations 
Board, 69 N.C.L. REV. 639, 642 (1991). 
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overrules its own precedent with little explanation other than 
changes in the composition of the Board.  
The NLRB is composed of five members appointed by the 
president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for five-
year terms.35
The Board operates through regional offices managed by 
regional directors who receive election petitions, direct and 
conduct union elections, and investigate and make cause de-
terminations when unfair labor practice charges are filed.
 The Board operates through regional offices man-
aged by regional directors who receive election petitions, direct 
and conduct union elections, and investigate and make cause 
determinations when unfair labor practice charges are filed. In 
the latter regard, when cause is found a complaint is filed and 
the Board’s Office of the General Counsel prosecutes the com-
plaint before an administrative law judge. Ultimately, an ap-
peal of the Board’s decisions on certain representational issues 
and unfair labor practice charges is available in the federal ap-
pellate courts with potential U.S Supreme Court review there-
after through a “petition for review.” 
36 In 
the latter regard, when cause is found a complaint is filed and 
the Board’s Office of the General Counsel prosecutes the com-
plaint before an administrative law judge.37 Ultimately, an ap-
peal of the Board’s decisions on certain representational issues 
and unfair labor practice charges is available in the federal ap-
pellate courts with potential U.S Supreme Court review there-
after through a “petition for review.”38
As initially conceived, the Board was to be made up of 
“strictly nonpartisan” government representatives.
 
39
 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012). 
 Democrat-
ic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman upheld this commitment to 
impartiality, generally drawing neutral Board appointees from 
government and academia; Eisenhower, however, the first Re-
publican to take office since the NLRA was enacted, set a dan-
gerous precedent when he began appointing management-side 
 36. Id. § 153(b). 
 37. Id. § 153(d). 
 38. Id. § 160(e)‒(f). 
 39. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARISON 
OF S. 2926 (73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) (Comm. Print 1935), re-
printed in 1 LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, at 
1319, 1320 (1949). 
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attorneys to the Board.40 Subsequent Republican presidents fol-
lowed Eisenhower’s lead by making additional management-
side appointments, and Reagan took the approach to a new lev-
el by appointing the first decidedly anti-union Board mem-
bers.41 Although Democratic Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and 
Carter had held to the Democratic tradition of appointing neu-
tral Board members, President Clinton finally reacted to Re-
publicans’ pro-management Board-packing strategy by appoint-
ing three pro-union attorneys to the Board.42 As a result, newly 
constituted Boards have made a practice of overruling prece-
dent created by past administrations’ Boards, with each Board 
instituting its own set of politically-motivated rules.43
I.  THE FLIP-FLOP PROBLEM   
 Over-
politicization of the Board has also led to an extremely conten-
tious appointment process, and as has been observed, exercise 
of the ‘nuclear’ option.  
Over the years, the Board’s practice of flip-flopping its po-
sitions on important industrial relations issues with each 
change in the White House has bred confusion, uncertainty, 
and operational inefficiencies for employers as they attempt to 
comply with standards, perhaps better characterized as ‘mov-
ing targets.’ The NLRB’s unbridled politicization and frequent 
policy shifts have eroded employer and union confidence in the 
Board as a capable and stable agency, as well as lawmakers, 
the public, academics, and the popular press.44
 
 40. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Trans-
formation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1454–55 (2000) 
(documenting backgrounds of Board members appointed from 1935 to 1998). 
 Federal courts, 
too, have expressed frustration with the Board’s constant policy 
 41. See id. at 1384–85. 
 42. See id. at 1394–95, 1455. Clinton was also the first Democratic presi-
dent to appoint management-side lawyers, choosing three to fill the Republi-
can seats on the Board. Id. at 1394. 
 43. See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Adminis-
trative Law Exile: Problems With Its Structure and Function and Suggestions 
for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2020 (2009). See generally Samuel Estreicher, 
Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 163 (1985). 
 44. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 
112TH CONG., PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PRO-UNION BOARD: THE NLRB’S META-
MORPHOSIS FROM INDEPENDENT REGULATOR TO DYSFUNCTIONAL UNION AD-
VOCATE 4 (2012) (describing “a pattern of behavior at the NLRB that under-
mines its integrity and creates an impression that the NLRB has morphed 
into a rogue agency plagued by systemic problems”); Estreicher, supra note 43, 
at 170–71. 
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oscillation and have accordingly afforded Board decisions lim-
ited deference.45 In 1983, for example, the Seventh Circuit criti-
cized the Board’s “fickleness” in the process of refusing to en-
force an order issued by the Board.46 During the adjudication 
process, the Board changed its position three times on the poli-
cy governing misrepresentations made during union election 
campaigns.47
Consecutive Boards have battled over the availability of 
card-check recognition for unions, a practice which allows un-
ions to establish recognition based on a showing of authoriza-
tion cards signed by employees, in lieu of going through a for-
mal NLRB-supervised election process.
 
48
 
 45. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB 
Policymaking and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 418–20 
(1995) (noting that federal courts frequently reverse questionable NLRB deci-
sions without remanding them back to the Board for further consideration). 
 In 2007, for example, 
the Republican-controlled Board struck down past precedent in 
order to institute a policy making it easier to decertify unions 
established by the card-check process than those certified by 
 46. Mosey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB., 701 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 47. Id. Two months before the election in Mosey, the Board held in Shop-
ping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), that it would no longer 
try to protect workers from misrepresentations made by either management or 
unions in election campaigns, as it had done in the fifteen years following Hol-
lywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). In April 1978 the Board ap-
plied to the Seventh Circuit for enforcement of its order against Mosey. Short-
ly before oral argument, the Board decided General Knit of California, Inc., 
239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), in which it overruled Shopping Kart and reinstated 
Hollywood Ceramics, but without saying whether it meant the new rule to ap-
ply to pending cases. Although the Board's counsel in Mosey urged the Sev-
enth Circuit to apply Hollywood Ceramics, the Seventh Circuit remanded the 
case to the Board and "express[ed] no view on the merits of any objection to 
the election." NLRB v. Mosey Mfg. Co., 595 F.2d 375, 375, n.2 (7th Cir. 1979). 
On remand, the administrative law judge found that the union had made a 
material misrepresentation which in light of a close vote made the election in-
valid. Mosey Mfg. Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 908 (1979). The Board reversed; it found 
there had been no misrepresentation and in any event it had not been materi-
al. Mosey Mfg. Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 552 (1981). The Board reinstated a bargain-
ing order and again applied to the Seventh Circuit for enforcement. Id. After 
oral argument, but before the Seventh Circuit panel handed down a decision, 
the Board decided Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), which 
overruled General Knit and reinstated Shopping Kart. 
 48. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 43, at 2021. For a general discussion 
of card-check authorization, see James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and 
Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
819, 824–40 (2005); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Struc-
tural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 668–
72 (2010). 
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NLRB-supervised elections.49 Less than five years later, the de-
cision was reversed by the Board under the Obama administra-
tion.50
NLRA Section 7 protects employees’ rights to support or re-
frain from supporting unions and to engage in protected con-
certed activity.
  
51 Protection of “concerted activity” generally ex-
tends to communications relating to terms and conditions of 
employment, arising in connected with activity by two or more 
employees or in a representative activity.52
The Board’s position on which activities and actors should 
be protected under Section 7 of the NLRA has also vacillated 
over time. One of the most significant battles has centered 
around the definition of the word “employee” for the purpose of 
determining which classes of workers may seek protection un-
der the NLRA. The Board has issued confusing and contradic-
tory decisions, for example, on which kinds of workers might 
fall into the category of supervisor, temporary employee, or in-
dependent contractor, and thus be denied the right to unionize 
or engage in collective bargaining activity protected by the 
Act.
 
53
The Board has also flip-flopped in its interpretation of 
what kinds of activities constitute “other concerted activities 
for . . .mutual aid or protection” under Section 7 of the Act.
  
54 
While Republican-controlled Boards have interpreted this pro-
tection narrowly, Democratic Boards have applied the protec-
tion to a broad range of non-union-related employee activism.55 
Another particularly egregious example concerns the Board’s 
position on whether Section 7 of the NLRA grants a non-union 
employee the right to have a co-worker representative present 
during investigatory issues. The Board answered yes to this 
question in 1982,56 no in 1985,57 yes again in 2000,58 and no 
again in 2004.59
 
 49. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). 
 
 50. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 52. Id.; Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285 (1998). 
 53. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 43, at 2027 n.68. 
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 55. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 43, at 2024. 
 56. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1010 (1982). 
 57. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 230 (1985). 
 58. Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000). 
 59. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004). 
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In one prominent example, the Board’s practice of flip-
flopping on an important issue under the Act has spanned half 
a century. In 1962, the Board concluded in the landmark Beth-
lehem Steel Company decision that employers could lawfully 
cancel a contractual dues checkoff arrangement when a collec-
tive bargaining agreement expires.60 This decision was reaf-
firmed 20 years later in 1982,61 and again in 2000.62 In the lat-
ter case, the Board cited numerous decisions relying on 
Bethlehem Steel during the intervening 38 years. The Board 
again reached the same decision in 2007, relying in that case on 
the specific language of the agreement at issue.63 However, the 
Board started to flip in 2010, when it deadlocked on this issue 
in a 2-2 vote, with one member having been recused from the 
case.64 Then in 2012—exactly 50 years after Bethlehem Steel—
the Board overruled that decision and held that employers can-
not unilaterally cancel dues checkoff upon expiration of a col-
lective bargaining agreement.65
The flip-flopping process at the Board frequently involves 
the agency’s most fundamental policy determinations. For ex-
ample, in the highly controversial Specialty Healthcare & Re-
habilitation Center decision,
  
66
Fundamentally, the NLRA does not require a petitioning 
union to propose the most appropriate unit for purposes of bar-
gaining. Rather, the Act merely requires a union to petition for 
“an” appropriate unit.
 the Board radically changed its 
historical “community of interest” standard for determining the 
scope of appropriate bargaining units.  
67
 
 60. Bethlehem Steel Company, 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962). 
 In determining whether a petitioned-for 
unit is “an” appropriate unit, the Board developed its communi-
ty of interest standard, under which, in general, employees in a 
broad array of job classifications can be deemed appropriate for 
inclusion in a single unit as long as they share common terms 
and conditions of employment, such as common supervision 
 61. Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 659 (1982). 
 62. Hacienda Resort Hotel, 331 N.L.R.B. 665 (2000). 
 63. Hacienda Resort Hotel, 351 N.L.R.B. 504 (2007). 
 64. Hacienda Resort Hotel, 355 N.L.R.B. 742 (2010). 
 65. WKYC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (2012). 
 66. Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83 
(2011), enforced 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 67. Bartlett Collins Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 484 (2001).  
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and management, functional integration, common wages and 
benefits, and the like.68
This standard was clarified in 1980, when the Board ex-
plained that its inquiry never addresses, solely and in isolation, 
the question whether employees have interests in common with 
each other, and it necessarily involves a further determination 
whether the interests of the group sought are sufficiently dis-
tinct from those of other employees to warrant the establish-
ment of a separate unit.
 
69 As recently as 2010, this approach to 
the community of interest analysis was reaffirmed by the 
Board.70 However, one year later, in Specialty Healthcare, the 
Board rejected this historical approach, while ostensibly return-
ing to the community of interest standard. The Board held in 
that case that if a petitioned-for group shares a community of 
interest, the burden is on the party who contends that other 
employees must be included in the unit to show they have an 
overwhelming community of interest with the original group.71 
This flip-flop by the Board is now ushering in an era of ‘“micro-
units.’” For example, in one recent case, the Board found ap-
propriate a unit limited to the canine technicians and instruc-
tors in a guide dog facility, excluding the various employees 
who provided other services relating to the guide dogs.72
Other examples of radical changes in the law due to shifts 
in control of the Board have occurred in the health care indus-
try. In 1974, Congress enacted the Health Care Amendments to 
the Act, extending its coverage to nonprofit health care institu-
tions.
 
73 This was followed by a series of decisions over the next 
10 years, in which the Board approved eight bargaining units 
in acute care hospitals based upon the traditional “community 
of interest” standard discussed above.74 However, in 1984, the 
Board adopted a “disparity of interest” standard for these insti-
tutions, leading to a small number of units.75
 
 68. In some industries the Board has gone so far as to identify “presump-
tively appropriate unit[s],” such as so-called “wall-to-wall” units in retail 
stores. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962); Haag Drug Co., Inc., 169 
N.L.R.B. 877 (1968).  
 But five years lat-
 69. Newton-Wellesley Hospital, 250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980). 
 70. Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. 637 (2010). 
 71. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at 1, 11. 
 72. Guide Dogs for the Blind, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 151 (2013). 
 73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(14), 158(d), 158(g) (2012). 
 74. See an explanation in 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 729–35 (John E. 
Higgins, Jr. ed., 6th ed. 2012) and cases cited therein. 
 75. St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 954 (1984). See also 1 THE DE-
  
1892 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1879 
 
er, the Board returned to the eight-unit structure for acute care 
hospitals by adopting a rule in an administrative rulemaking 
proceeding.76
The bargaining unit rule adopted by the Board for acute 
care hospitals does not apply to non-acute facilities such as 
nursing homes.
  
77 In 1991, the Board decided not to rely on ei-
ther the “community of interest” standard or the “disparity of 
interest” standard for these facilities.78 The Board stated that it 
would consider not only community of interest factors but also 
background information gathered during the acute care rule-
making and prior precedent.79 However, the Board reversed 
course 20 years later, when it overruled the prior precedent for 
non-acute health care facilities and ostensibly returned to the 
community of interest standard, albeit a radically different ver-
sion of that standard.80
It is clear that the process of adjudicating claims brought 
under the NLRA must be depoliticized in order to facilitate 
fairness and predictability of decision-making. This Article ar-
gues that this goal would be best accomplished by eliminating 
the NLRB’s adjudicative function in unfair labor practice case 
and amending the NLRA to authorize federal district courts to 
hear such cases following investigation and conciliation efforts 
by the Board. Ceding decision-making power to life-appointed 
Article III judges would greatly de-politicize the process, result-
ing in more reasoned, consistent, and reliable precedent. It 
would also eliminate the contentiousness of the Board ap-
pointment process and allow the Board to focus on those func-
tions for which it is best suited as a result of its unique agency 
expertise—administering representation cases, investigating 
and prosecuting unfair labor practices, and resolving claims 
that are of questionable merit or otherwise appropriate for ear-
ly resolution. Increased consistency of decision-making would 
 These “policy” shifts could be readily in-
terpreted as political, based on the composition of the boards in 
question and the context in which their decisions were ren-
dered.  
 
VELOPING LABOR LAW 729–35 supra note 74, and cases cited therein for fur-
ther discussion. 
 76. 29 C.F.R § 103.30 (2012). The Supreme Court approved the rule in 
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1991). 
 77. 29 C.F.R § 103.30. 
 78. See Park Manor Care Ctr., Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 872, 875 (1991). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Ctr., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, at 16 
(2011).  
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also be expected to result in less litigation, as the temptation to 
bring cases in hopes of inciting the latest policy reversal will be 
lessened. Further, allowing litigants to bring their cases direct-
ly to federal district courts will increase expediency of decision-
making, which will lead to more effective vindication of Section 
7 rights as well as a stronger deterrent to unfair labor practices 
by both employers and unions. 
Part III below will lay out a new plan for labor law reform 
and address the anticipated effects and potential limitations of 
the proposal. 
II.  ELIMINATING THE NLRB AS ADJUDICATOR: A NEW 
PLAN FOR LABOR LAW REFORM AND ANTICIPATED 
EFFECTS/LIMITATIONS OF THE PLAN   
A. THE PROPOSAL FOR REFORM  
The primary change suggested by this proposal is the revi-
sion of Section 10 of the Act and related procedural regulations 
to eliminate the Board’s authority to adjudicate unfair labor 
practice cases and transfer that responsibility to the federal 
district courts. This approach generally follows the procedural 
structure of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as adapted to the 
Board’s existing organizational structure. 
Under the proposal, the Board’s regional directors, acting 
on behalf of the agency’s General Counsel, would continue to 
investigate unfair labor practice charges and determine wheth-
er they have merit. If no merit is found, a charge would be dis-
missed. However, if the regional director finds merit in a 
charge, an attempt would be made to reach a settlement 
through conciliation between the respondent (employer or un-
ion) and the charging party. If a settlement is not reached, the 
charging party could file a complaint in an appropriate federal 
district court based upon the allegations in the charge. In the 
alternative, the General Counsel, on behalf of the Board, could 
file such a complaint. A decision of the district court could be 
appealed by the losing party to the federal courts of appeals.81 
These procedures would follow the same general approach es-
tablished by Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.82
 
 81. Alternatively, to extinguish forum shopping, one federal appellate 
court, e.g., the D.C. Circuit, could be designated as the “labor” court of appeals. 
 
 82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5 (2012) (describing the enforcement provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act). 
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If a district court finds that a respondent (employer or un-
ion) has violated the Act, it could impose the same cease-and-
desist and affirmative action remedies under this plan that are 
now available to the Board under Section 10(c) of the Act.83 Alt-
hough that section provides for a remedy of reinstatement and 
back pay, and it also authorizes certain other monetary reme-
dies in appropriate cases, it does not permit compensatory or 
punitive damages.84 Adjustments to add those damages and 
provisions relating to fee-shifting should be considered to create 
added incentive for traditional labor lawyers to take charges in-
to federal court.85
As a result of the changes outlined above, regional direc-
tors would no longer issue a complaint against a respondent 
when a determination is made that a charge has merit. Fur-
thermore, administrative law judges would no longer hold hear-
ings on unfair labor practice complaints or issue recommended 
decisions for review by the Board. The function of administra-
tive law judges would be eliminated.  
 While the General Counsel presumably would 
require no such incentives in order to initiate federal court liti-
gation over unfair labor practice allegations deemed meritori-
ous, the ability to recover damages and fees on behalf of the 
charging party or the government would similarly aid the 
Board in fulfilling its function of vindicating Section 7 rights. In 
addition, the proposal does not provide for jury trials or class 
actions, which are not available under the Act.  
There would be no change, however, in the Board’s respon-
sibility for processing representation cases under Section 8 of 
the Act. Regional directors, acting on behalf of the Board, 
would continue to conduct representation hearings; determine 
the scope of appropriate units; rule on the eligibility of voters; 
conduct secret ballot elections;86
 
 83. See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era 
of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 221–22 (2010) (discussing the Board’s au-
thority under 10(c)). 
 rule on election objections and 
 84. See id. 
 85. New remedies could be added to cases involving representational is-
sues that would promote compliance by unions and employers. For example, if 
an employer violates the Act, the employer would be subject to card checks. 
And if a union violates the Act, it would be barred from organizing that em-
ployer for two years. 
 86. One paradigm change that would make the proposal more attractive 
to organized labor is to establish a baseline rule that if a union presents au-
thorization cards signed by a majority of employees it seeks to represent, an 
employer can demand a secret ballot election in forty-two days, provided the 
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challenges to voter eligibility; and certify the results of elec-
tions. As in the past, the losing party could file a request for re-
view of a regional director’s decision with the Board, and the 
Board would decide whether to reverse or modify the regional 
director’s decision. 
In addition, the regional director, on behalf of the Board, 
would continue to resolve other representation issues that do 
not involve the election of a representative. For example, the 
regional director would hear and resolve petitions to clarify a 
bargaining unit; petitions to amend a certification; and peti-
tions for an election to “deauthorize” a union security provision 
in a collective bargaining agreement that imposes a require-
ment of mandatory union membership. And the Board would 
continue to rule on requests for review of such decisions.  
In one change from the past, an employer would no longer 
be required to commit a “technical” refusal to bargain in order 
to obtain judicial review of the Board’s decision in a representa-
tion case. This procedural anomaly would be eliminated by 
providing a right to appeal such a decision to an appropriate 
federal court of appeals. The appeal would be expedited so as 
not to deprive employees of the benefits of collective bargaining 
if the appeal is denied. The duty to bargain would commence if 
and when the appellate court dismisses the appeal and orders 
bargaining. Without this change, under current procedures, the 
parties are required to go through the motions of a pro forma 
charge proceeding to find the employer guilty of a “technical” 
unfair labor practice before appellate review of the decision is 
permitted—thus burdening the court’s docket and causing 
needless expense for both the employer and the union.87 Fur-
thermore, the employer appeals at its peril because the duty to 
bargain would be retroactive, a result that is contrary to the 
principle of due process of law.88
For example, if a regional director, relying on the Specialty 
Healthcare decision discussed above, approves a micro-unit re-
quested by a petitioning union in a representation case—such 
as the ladies shoe department in a department store—and the 
Board certifies the union as bargaining representative follow-
ing an election in that unit, the employer could file an appeal 
 
 
employer allows equal workplace access. If an employer refuses to allow union 
access, elections would then be directed in two weeks. 
 87. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012) (delineating the procedure for appellate re-
view). 
 88. See id. § 158 (discussing retroactive application of Board decisions). 
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directly with the circuit court of appeals to challenge the 
Board’s decision. Similarly, if the Board sets aside an employ-
er’s victory in a representation election because of a wage in-
crease granted during the pre-election campaign, and the union 
wins a second election and is certified by the Board, the em-
ployer could file an appeal from that decision directly with the 
court of appeals.  
One other procedural change would be required to transfer 
the adjudication of unfair labor practice charges to the federal 
district courts. Under current procedure, a party losing a repre-
sentation election can file both election objections and unfair 
labor practice charges based upon the same conduct.89 The ob-
jections and charges are then consolidated for decision by an 
administrative law judge.90
In recognition of this procedural overlap, federal judges 
would stay any action on unfair labor practice allegations in a 
complaint based on the same conduct as election objections un-
der review by the Board, until the Board finally resolves the 
matter. At that point, the court would dismiss the allegations 
unless the interests of justice require continued litigation after 
the Board’s decision. In addition, the court would stay action on 
such allegations if review of the Board’s representation decision 
has been sought in the court of appeals.  
 This procedural approach would no 
longer be workable because the district court, instead of the 
Board, would rule on unfair labor practice charges, while the 
Board would rule on election objections. From the standpoint of 
the representation case, however, this change would have no 
legal impact because a finding of objectionable conduct affect-
ing the outcome of an election is sufficient to set aside the elec-
tion and order that a new one be conducted.  
Under current procedure, a union can file “blocking charg-
es” to prevent a representation election from being conducted.91 
This typically occurs in the case of a petition by employees for a 
decertification election, or an “RM” election petition filed by an 
employer when a union has sought recognition but declines to 
file a petition for an election.92
 
 89. See 22 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 52:659 (discussing representation proceed-
ings). 
 Regional directors have wide 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Sarah Pawlicki, Levitz Furniture Co.: The End of Celanese and the 
Good-Faith Doubt Standard for Withdrawing Recognition of Incumbent Un-
ions, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 381, 382 & n.11 (2003) (discussing blocking charg-
es). 
 92. Id. 
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discretion in allowing elections to be blocked, and this some-
times results in the delay of an election for months and in some 
cases for years—especially when the union resorts to the tactic 
of filing consecutive unmeritorious charges over a long period of 
time.93
To effectuate this important policy, elections could still be 
blocked by the incumbent union under the proposal, but for a 
maximum period of 14 days regardless of the number of charg-
es filed. Of course, if the conduct leading to a charge is also al-
leged in election objections, and if the regional director con-
cludes that the conduct was objectionable and affected the 
outcome of the election, a new election could be ordered. The 
same rules would also apply when a petitioning union files a 
charge to block an RC election. In either event, whether the 
charges are filed by an incumbent union or a petitioning union, 
allegations pending in a lawsuit in federal district court would 
not block an election. Otherwise, the district court would be 
drawn into the mechanics of the representation proceeding, 
which would be unworkable.
 This is contrary to the central policy of the Act, which is 
to allow employees to freely choose their bargaining repre-
sentative, or to choose not to be represented at all.  
94
Union proponents might argue that this limitation on the 
blocking charge tactic would result in holding elections without 
the requisite laboratory conditions. However, this policy must 
coexist with the equally important policy of allowing employees 
to vote on whether they want to be represented by the union 
involved in the election. It is contrary to this policy to allow a 
union to delay for months, and sometimes years, the election 
that will provide that opportunity. Furthermore, if the union is 
  
 
 93. A study of cases in 2008 found that the median number of days be-
tween the filing of an election petition and the holding of a representation 
election when blocking charges were filed was 139 days, as compared to 38 
days in unblocked cases. See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration 
of the National Labor Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 5 FLA INT’L U. 
L. REV. 361, 369 (2010). In some cases, the delay resulting from blocking 
charges is much longer than this median number. For example, the delay was 
more than three years in Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064, 
1065 (5th Cir. 1971). The delay was more than two years when the appellate 
court issued its decision in NLRB v. Anvil Prods., Inc., 496 F.2d 94, 95 (5th 
Cir. 1974). And it was 2.5 years when the decision was issued in Bishop v. 
NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 94. Alternatively, certain representation cases involving peripheral issues 
could be managed in arbitration with expedited timelines, and judicial appeal 
following thereafter. See infra, Part II.B.2.C (discussing “minor” unfair labor 
practice charges). 
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unsuccessful in the election, it can be set aside and a new one 
held if the Board determines that laboratory conditions did not 
exist.  
Certain other functions of the Board would remain unaf-
fected by this proposal. For example, the Board is responsible 
for resolving jurisdictional disputes by awarding work to one of 
two competing unions under Section 10(k) of the Act when a 
charge has been filed under Section 8(b)(4)(D).95 In addition, 
the Board is required to seek injunctive relief under Section 
10(l) of the Act when a union is engaging in an unlawful sec-
ondary boycott under Section 8(b)(4)(B).96 And the Board has 
the power to seek temporary injunctive relief in federal district 
court under Section 10(j) of the Act when a complaint has been 
issued alleging a violation of the Act.97
Although the Board has interpreted the Act through adju-
dication of cases in the past, it would not be able to do so in the 
future (except for representation cases), because that function 
would be transferred to the courts as outlined above. Thus, the 
proposal anticipates that the Board may decide to interpret the 
law through more frequent rule-making than in the past. How-
ever, adopting substantive (legislative) regulations is a very la-
borious and time-consuming process, and it frequently serves 
as a lightning rod for challenge in the courts.
 All of these functions 
would continue as under existing law, with minor conforming 
amendments to reflect the changes in the adjudication of 
charges outlined above. 
98 As an alterna-
tive, the proposal authorizes the Board to issue interpretive 
guidelines—similar to guidelines issued by the EEOC under Ti-
tle VII—which do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Although such guidelines do not have the force of law, as in the 
case of substantive regulations adopted through the notice-and-
comment process, they are entitled to consideration by the 
courts in construing a statute.99
 
 95. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012). 
  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Scott A. Zebrak, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking: Analyzing the 
Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care Bargaining Unit 
Rule and by the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
125, 128–29 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of rule-making). 
 99. AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–11 n.6 (2002) (citing EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)) (EEOC's interpretive guide-
lines do not receive deference under Chevron U.S. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Such interpretations are entitled to respect 
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 B. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL 
It is anticipated that the proposal outlined above will have 
the following effects, which are expressed as advantages and 
disadvantages. In addition, the anticipated reactions of labor 
and management are noted on key points. 
1. Advantages 
(a) The decision-making process under the Act should be 
less political than in the past because federal district court 
judges are likely to be more objective than Board members. The 
individuals who are appointed to serve on the Board typically 
have represented either labor or management for many years, 
and frequently they resume their partisan professional careers 
upon leaving the Board.100 Furthermore, this agency has been 
invested by Congress with wide discretion to make labor policy 
for the nation, as distinguished from strictly interpreting statu-
tory language and making factual determinations, which allows 
the latitude to make discretionary decisions reflecting the re-
spective backgrounds of the Board members. Of course, judges 
also have biases, which typically reflect the political affiliation 
of the president who appoints them. However, judges are more 
likely to follow the law than their policy preferences.101 Moreo-
ver, district court judges will be required to follow the law as 
determined by the appellate judges in their respective cir-
cuits—unlike the Board, which typically rejects any precedent 
established by an appellate court with which it disagrees, ac-
cepting the court’s decision only as “the law of the case.”102
(b) The instability in the law resulting from frequent flip-
flopping by the Board on key issues under the Act, as described 
above, should be sharply curtailed if federal judges are the de-
cision-makers on unfair labor practice issues instead of the 
Board. This would seem to necessarily follow from the proposed 
change in the existing system, where one agency can, in a sin-
  
 
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (citing Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) (but only to the extent that those in-
terpretations have the power to persuade). 
 100. See Joan Flynn, “Expertness For What?”: The Gould Years at the 
NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 465, 474‒77 (2000) (discussing the biases of potential nominees). 
 101. See, e.g., Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of Circuit Court Gatekeeping De-
cisions, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 129, 136 (2010) (discussing circuit courts’ priori-
ty of deference to circuit decisions to maintain uniformity in law rather than 
expression of policy preferences of circuit court judges). 
 102. White, supra note 34, at 641–42. 
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gle case, change the law for the entire country simply by 
achieving a majority of three (or sometimes two) members on 
the Board. A federal district court judge would not have the 
same nation-wide jurisdiction, and he or she would be con-
trolled by the precedent in that particular circuit. Under the 
current system, the Board has no similar requirement to acqui-
esce in the precedent of a circuit; and in some cases, the Board 
appears repeatedly before the same circuit in defense of the 
same position on an issue, knowing that it will lose the case, 
but nevertheless “respectfully disagreeing” with the court of 
appeals. 
(c) As the Board becomes less politicized, the process of ap-
pointing and confirming Board members should also become 
less political. This would reduce the likelihood that the Board 
will lose a quorum because of filibusters in the Senate. Twice in 
recent years the Board has been besieged by challenges to its 
ability to function as an agency of the federal government. In 
the first case, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,103 the Board 
had attempted to function with only two members for a period 
of twenty-seven months because of an inability of the President 
to make recess appointments due to a filibuster in the Senate. 
The Supreme Court held that a quorum of at least three mem-
bers is required by the Act, and it therefore invalidated roughly 
six hundred decisions issued by the two-member Board.104 Cur-
rently, in Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,105 the Su-
preme Court is considering whether several recess appoint-
ments to the Board were unconstitutional. If so, hundreds of 
the Board’s decisions over recent years will be invalidated.106
And most recently, on November 21, 2013, the Democratic 
leadership in the Senate found it necessary to invoke, using a 
rare parliamentary move, the “nuclear option”—a change in the 
Senate’s filibuster rules—in order to obtain confirmation of a 
new slate of nominees to the Board.
  
107
 
 103. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639 (2010).  
 In light of these devel-
 104. See id.  
 105. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 133 S.Ct. 2861 (2013). 
 106. See New Process Steel, L.P., 130 S. Ct. at 2639. 
 107. The rules change eliminates the ability of the minority party to hold 
up nominations for executive branch and judicial (except Supreme Court) ap-
pointments, including NLRB member appointments. Now, only a simple ma-
jority of fifty-one votes, instead of the sixty vote supermajority requirements 
that has applied for almost forty years, is needed to approve the appointments. 
It is debatable whether this legislative “flip flop” will have its intended effect, 
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opments, it should be obvious that the Board must be depoliti-
cized if it is to continue to function as a vital federal agency.  
When the politicization of the Board results in develop-
ments like New Process Steel and Noel Canning, unions and 
employers must wait for years to learn the ultimate outcome of 
cases that are critical to their interests—not only the parties to 
the individual cases but also the larger employer community 
and organized labor. It is impossible to calculate the inefficien-
cy cost of this legal quagmire, but it clearly is substantial. For 
example, because of the Noel Canning issue, unions and em-
ployers do not know whether an employer can lawfully cancel 
dues check-off upon the expiration of a collective bargaining 
agreement;108 whether an employer must turn over confidential 
witness statements to a union;109 whether an employer that los-
es a union election must bargain with the union over layoffs 
and individual disciplinary actions while negotiating an initial 
collective bargaining agreement;110 and whether an employer 
must bargain over the “effects” of implementing a managerial 
decision that is clearly authorized by the management rights 
clause of an agreement with the union.111
Indeed, this uncertainty extends far beyond the union-
management context. For example, numerous class and collec-
tive action litigants have been waiting for years to learn 
whether the Board can prohibit nonunion companies from in-
cluding a waiver of such actions in a mandatory employment 
arbitration agreement.
  
112 And companies must wait for years to 
learn whether the Board can intrude on the nonunion work-
place to rewrite confidentiality agreements, nondisparagement 
policies, and rules requiring employees to be courteous at 
work;113
 
as Republicans have already signaled that when the constitution of the Senate 
changes, appointments will move forward (or not) along party lines. 
 whether an employer can direct employees to hold in 
confidence an ongoing investigation of misconduct in the work-
 108. WKYC-TV, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 30, at 1 (2012).  
 109. Piedmont Gardens, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 46, at 1 (2012).  
 110. Alan Ritchey, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 40, at 1 (2012).  
 111. Heartland Health Care Ctr.-Plymouth Court, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 155, at 
1–2 (2013).  
 112. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 1–2 (2012). 
 113. See, e.g., DirecTV U.S. DirecTV Holdings, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 
at 1 (2013); Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 127, at 1 (2012); Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, at 1 (2012). 
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place;114 and whether employers can fire employees for posting 
harassing material on social media sites.115
(d) In at least some cases, the decision-making process un-
der the Act might take less time in federal court than in the 
two-step process at the NLRB, which includes an ALJ proceed-
ing that culminates in a recommended decision, followed by an 
appeal (known as “exceptions”) filed at the Board by the losing 
party. Of course, litigation in federal court can also be ponder-
ous and time-consuming, given the opportunity for extensive 
discovery, complex procedural requirements, and crowded dis-
trict court dockets. However, some cases languish at the Board 
for several years before a decision is issued, and this should oc-
cur with less frequency, if at all, when the cases are under the 
control of a federal judge.  
 
(e) Until the Supreme Court resolves an issue under the 
Act, the Board does not consider itself bound by appellate court 
rulings, except as the law of the case.116
(f) When the Board now seeks temporary injunctive relief 
in federal district court under Section 10(j) of the Act, the bar 
for granting such relief is quite low.
 It appears that the 
Board might continue to follow this controversial practice of 
non-acquiescence, even under the structure recommended in 
the proposal. However, the district courts, which would make 
the decisions in unfair labor practice cases, would be obligated 
to follow the law in their respective circuits. This should in-
crease respect for the judiciary and the rule of law. In addition, 
it would result in a more stable body of case law to serve as 
precedent to guide employers and unions in the future.  
117 The court can grant any 
relief that “it deems just and proper.”118
 
 114. Banner Estrella Med. Ctr., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93, at 2 (2012). 
 This can place the re-
spondent (employer or union) at an unfair disadvantage in sub-
sequently litigating the same issue before an ALJ and the 
Board, because the court has already ruled on key issues in de-
ciding whether to grant the request for temporary relief. In ef-
fect, the decision is issued and relief granted by the judge on a 
temporary showing before the case is fully litigated before the 
ALJ and the Board. Under the proposal, the Section 10(j) pro-
ceeding would be consolidated with the litigation in the same 
 115. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 1–2 (2012). 
 116. White, supra note 34, at 644. 
 117. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012). 
 118. Id. 
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court over the allegations in the charge, thus eliminating, to a 
certain extent, this unfair procedure.  
(g) Currently a party that is aggrieved by a final order of 
the Board in an unfair labor practice case is able to engage in a 
limited amount of appellate forum-shopping when it seeks re-
view of an NLRB decision on the charges.119 Section 10(f) of the 
Act provides that the party may obtain a review of such order 
in any federal court of appeals in the circuit where the unfair 
labor practice was alleged to have occurred; or where the party 
resides or transacts business; or in the District of Columbia 
Circuit.120
(h) Interpreting the law through the adoption of interpre-
tive guidelines by the Board, instead of the case-by-case adjudi-
cation of unfair labor practice charges by that agency, could 
prove to be a more efficient and orderly process, potentially 
leading to better results from a policy standpoint. However, 
this would not preclude flip-flopping by the Board to effectuate 
policy changes in the guidelines when there is a change in con-
trol of the Board. In addition, employers would likely view even 
this informal type of rulemaking as a negative change.
 This option would no longer be available under the 
proposal because appellate review of unfair labor practice deci-
sions would occur in the circuit in which the district court mak-
ing the decision is located. Some may consider this change an 
improvement from a policy standpoint. It would likely be con-
sidered a negative change by employers, however, as it would 
narrow their review options. And unions might also be opposed 
to it if they are focused on the cases that might arise in which 
they are the respondent. 
121 Re-
cent experience with the Board’s notice-posting rule,122
 
 119. Id. 
 and es-
 120. Id. 
 121. See infra Part II.C (discussing whether the NLRB should be limited to 
promulgating interpretive and procedural rules and policy statements, as the 
EEOC is under Title VII). 
 122. Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,008 (Aug. 30, 2011) (codified at 29 
C.F.R. § 104). Soon after the final rule was issued, two district court cases 
were filed challenging its validity. In Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. 
Supp. 2d 778, 780 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013), a South 
Carolina district court determined that the Board lacked the authority to 
promulgate the rule. The Fourth Circuit later affirmed the decision. Chamber 
of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013). Soon after, the D.C. cir-
cuit enjoined implementation of the rule. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-
5068, 2012 WL 4328371, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 2012) (order granting tempo-
rary injunction). A subsequent D.C. Circuit ruling vacated the rule for invalid 
enforcement provisions. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 963–64 
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pecially the so-called, “quickie” election rule123
(i) The proposal would provide an orderly procedure for ap-
pealing representation case decisions of the Board to the appel-
late courts, which would be far more efficient and cost-effective 
than pro forma litigation over “technical” refusals to bargain. 
In addition, employers would no longer need to be in the posi-
tion of intentionally refusing to bargain in order to appeal a de-
cision they believe to be incorrect, nor would they be subject to 
retroactive penalties for actions taken without bargaining dur-
ing the period of appellate review. These are compelling argu-
ments from a due process standpoint. Even though the proposal 
includes an expedited appeal process, unions still may view this 
procedural modification as a negative, as they are unlikely to 
welcome the elimination of penalties in a process that will, 
even if reduced, continue to create delay.  
—known by some 
as the “ambush” election rule—have taught employers that a 
Board determined to change policy will find a way to do so. 
Limiting the Board to enforcing the NLRA through interpreta-
tive guidance, rather than binding legislative rules, will guard 
against the unproductive flip-flopping this Article has high-
lighted as a reason for change.  
(j) Union reliance on blocking charges should be reduced by 
the proposal, thus promoting the core policy of the Act that em-
ployees should have a free choice in making decisions on ques-
tions of union representation. However, unions would likely 
view this as a negative change because it would deprive them of 
a tactical weapon in fending off challenges to their representa-
tive status.  
2. Disadvantages 
(a) The litigation of unfair labor practice cases likely would 
be more expensive in some cases than under the current system 
for the charging party (usually a union or individual) because of 
 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). As a result of this litigation, the rule has yet to be imple-
mented in any form. 
 123. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138 (Dec. 22, 2011) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–02). The rule was ultimately struck down 
by a D.C. Circuit court for failure to meet quorum requirements in promulgat-
ing the rule. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18, 30 (D.D.C. 
2012). This led the NLRB to suspend its enforcement. See Press Release, 
NLRB, NLRB Suspends Implementation of Representation Case Amendments 
Based on Court Ruling (May 15, 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news 
-outreach/news-story/nlrb-suspends-implementation-representation-case 
-amendments-based-court.  
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a need to retain counsel to file an action in federal court. Cur-
rently the General Counsel prosecutes unfair labor practice 
charges in proceedings before an ALJ and the Board after issu-
ing a complaint.124 The charging party can be represented by 
separate counsel in such proceedings, but this is not neces-
sary.125
(b) Litigation in court over unfair labor practice allegations 
would probably be more expensive for both parties than NLRB 
proceedings, and there could still be considerable delay. Such 
litigation includes extensive discovery requirements, personal 
appearances in court by counsel to argue motions, and greater 
procedural formality than exists under NLRB procedures. Sav-
vy labor lawyers from the ranks of either management or orga-
nized labor may be postured, under our model, to “game” court 
review for extended periods of time. These problems, however, 
could be mitigated somewhat by special local rules or judge’s 
standing orders prescribing more streamlined and less burden-
some procedures for unfair labor practice cases. 
 Under the proposal, the General Counsel could file an 
action in court, but it would not be required to do so. Thus, in 
at least some cases, the charging party would need to obtain 
counsel. Unions are likely to view this as a negative change. 
(c) Many unfair labor practice complaints issued under the 
Act involve matters of relatively minor significance, especially 
in monetary terms. Parties often litigate before the Board over 
such nonmonetary issues as posting a notice stating that an 
employer will avoid allegedly unlawful conduct in the future. At 
issue can be such questions as the precise wording on the no-
tice, how broadly it must be disseminated, and whether a com-
pany executive must read it aloud in a meeting of employees. 
Given the anticipated costs associated with litigation in the 
courts, it is likely that at least some cases of this type would 
not be filed under the proposal if the General Counsel is unwill-
ing or unavailable to file an action in court to enforce the reme-
dy. Unions are likely to view this possibility as a negative 
change. 
(d) The Board’s General Counsel currently attains a high 
settlement rate in unfair labor practice cases. For example, in 
the most recent report on this subject, the General Counsel 
stated that the settlement rate had been 91 percent for merito-
rious cases during fiscal year 2012.126
 
 124. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.8, 101.10 (2013). 
 Given the increased cost 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Memorandum from Lafe Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to all 
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of litigation for charging parties, employers might be less in-
clined to settle some cases, anticipating that an action would 
not be filed in court. 
(e) This proposal already relegates the more technical as-
pects of NLRA administration to the Board, in recognition of 
the fact that the Board’s administrative law judges, staff attor-
neys and its General Counsel develop a high level of expertise 
under the Act, as do the Board members themselves. However, 
it may still be argued that federal judges would be faced with a 
steep learning curve under the proposal, and they would sel-
dom acquire the same level of expertise under the Act as per-
sonnel at the Board.While this may be offset by other consider-
ations, for example, the federal judiciary being uniquely suited 
to assume the adjudicative responsibilities outlined in this pro-
posal, to a certain extent it might be considered a negative fac-
tor.  
(f) The bifurcation of the litigation process in election cases 
between representation and unfair labor practice issues under 
the proposal is likely to be a less efficient approach than the 
current system of consolidating the issues in one case before an 
ALJ. But there does not appear to be any alternative as it 
would not be feasible for federal judges to conduct union repre-
sentation elections, or to make the numerous legal decisions 
that are currently made by the Board and its regional directors 
in connection with such elections. 
(g) Although the proposal contemplates the adoption of in-
terpretive guidelines like those adopted by the EEOC under Ti-
tle VII, instead of substantive (legislative) regulations, employ-
ers are likely to view this or any other form of increased 
rulemaking as harmful to their interests. Furthermore, alt-
hough the proposal contemplates that the guidelines would be 
entitled to some deference by federal judges but would not be 
binding, the Board has broad rulemaking authority under the 
Act, and it could resort instead to the adoption of substantive 
regulations. This would require a higher degree of deference by 
the federal courts than is contemplated by the proposal. 
(h) The shift in adjudication authority to district courts 
would also affect the caseloads of those courts, which already 
have high numbers of matters on their dockets, as well as many 
vacant positions. While courts might, then, be initially hesitant 
with this realignment, some of the concerns about backlog 
 
employees, Summary of Operations for the Fiscal Year 2012, at 4 (Jan. 8, 
2013), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=ldue-93utkr. 
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might be ameliorated with, e.g., some form of specialized feder-
al labor law bench comparable to the structure already in place 
for bankruptcy matters. 
C. LIMITING THE NLRB TO PROMULGATING INTERPRETIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL RULES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, MIRRORING THE 
EEOC’S ROLE UNDER TITLE VII 
To move away from a rulemaking model that replicates 
binding flip-flopping and politically-based outcomes, we propose 
Board rule-making authority in the form of administrative 
guidelines, similar to those adopted by the EEOC, instead of 
legislative (binding) rules. As with guidance from other admin-
istrative agencies, Board guidance would be subject to some 
deference by the federal courts, given the Board’s labor rela-
tions subject matter expertise. Ultimately, however, courts 
would be free to rule outside Board guidelines, applying what 
over time would become a new (and, we submit, more stable) 
body of judicial labor law precedent.  
1. Rulemaking Under Federal Law Generally. 
Federal administrative agency rulemaking can a play a 
significant role within the United States government’s estab-
lishment of federal law. The basic rulemaking framework for 
federal agency rulemaking was established under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA” or “Act”).127 Under the 
APA, a federal “rule” is, “the whole or part of an agency state-
ment of general or particular applicability and future effect de-
signed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or de-
scribing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements 
of an agency.”128
Implementing rules add no substance to legislative direc-
tion that has been fully developed; rules interpreting and clari-
fying statutory ambiguities, and prescriptive rules (also re-
ferred to as “legislative” rules) establish substantive law where 
 
 
 127. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 5372, 7521 
(2012) (establishing a rule making framework). 
 128. Id. § 551(4); see CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULE-
MAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 2–3 
(4th ed. 2011) (“[A] rule is the skin of a living policy . . . it hardens an inchoate 
normative judgment into the frozen form of words . . . . Its issuance marks the 
transformation of policy from the private wish to public expectation . . . . [T]he 
framing of a rule is the climactic act of the policy making process.” (quoting U. 
of Penn. Law School Dean Colin Diver, paraphrasing Oliver Wendell Holmes)).  
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Congress has provided little detail about how law and policy ob-
jectives are achieved.129
The APA establishes “formal rulemaking” (seldom used)
  
130 
processes and “informal rulemaking” processes.131 Informal 
rulemaking is commonly characterized as “notice-and-
comment” rulemaking and requires each agency to satisfy basic 
procedural steps: (1) publication of notice of proposed rulemak-
ing; (2) public participation via submission of written com-
ments; and (3) at least 30 days prior to a rule’s effective date, 
final rule publication supported by a statement of basis and 
purpose.132 No public hearings are required for notice and com-
ment rulemaking.133
Rules regarding agency organization, procedure and prac-
tice, agency personnel manuals, interpretive rules, and general 
policy statements are subject to publication requirements, but 
are exempt from the other APA requirements.
 
134 They are valid 
upon Federal Register publication.135
The outcome of notice and comment rulemaking satisfying 
all APA requirements is the creation of legislative or substan-
tive rules having “the force or effect of law.”
  
136 That is, they are 
binding on the government and private parties until judicially 
overturned or the agency rescinds them.137 In contrast, while 
courts’ interpretation of federal law generally accords some 
weight to an agency’s views as expressed in interpretive 
rules,138
 
 129. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 
 interpretive rules, advisory in nature, have no binding 
128, at 5–6, 22. 
 130. Formal rulemaking is mandatory when a non-APA statute provides a 
rule must be “made on the record after opportunity for agency hearing.” 5 
U.S.C. § 553(c). Formal rulemaking procedures are rarely used except in cer-
tain “rate-making, agriculture marketing order and food additive proceed-
ings.” JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 5 (5th 
ed. 2012). 
 131. Am. Bar Ass’n, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative 
Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 30–36 (2002). 
 132. Id. (summarizing notice and comment rulemaking). 
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (providing interested persons an opportunity 
to participate, but no requirement for an oral hearing). 
 134. Id. § 553(b)(A); see also Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the 
NLRB: A Viable Alternative to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2005). 
 135. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012) (stating that publication in the Federal Regis-
ter creates a presumption of validity). 
 136. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979). 
 137. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS: IN A NUTSHELL 315–16 (3d ed. 1990).  
 138. Id. at 317. 
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effect139 and are not entitled to deference if inconsistent with 
statutory intent. In contrast, they may be developed “in any 
way an agency sees fit.”140
2. Current NLRB Rules Are Mainly Procedural, Not 
Substantive  
 
While the Board has rulemaking NLRA authority,141 the 
Board may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to exer-
cise that authority or to establish national labor policy via ad-
judication.142 Nevertheless, NLRB rules found at 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 101-104143 are mainly procedural, not substantive. Part 101 
(“Statements of Procedure”) and 102 (“Rules and Regulations”) 
establish procedures relating to investigation and prosecution 
of unfair labor practice charges and compliance with NLRB or-
ders as well as the conduct of questions concerning representa-
tion, including union elections.144 Part 103 does contain some 
limited substantive rules: Subpart A sets forth jurisdictional 
standards covering colleges and universities, symphony orches-
tras and the horseracing and dog-racing industries, and Sub-
part C establishes rules governing appropriate bargaining 
units in the healthcare industry.145
In contrast, NLRB rulemaking initiatives following prom-
ulgation of the healthcare regulations have failed. In 1992, the 
Board attempted, unsuccessfully, to memorialize via rulemak-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Communications 
 Promulgation of the 
healthcare bargaining unit rules in 1989 was the first and only 
successful exercise by the NLRB of its rulemaking authority in 
any material way to establish substantive law.  
 
 139. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236–37 (1974). 
 140. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 128, at 22–23 (“[I]nterpretive rules 
may stretch law or rules . . . [but] do not impose new legal obligations . . . .” 
(citing as example Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s “Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection”)). 
 141. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (stating that the NLRB has authority to 
"make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the [APA], such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out” the provisions of the NLRA); 
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609 (1991) (upholding NLRB’s 
healthcare unit rule); id. at 610 (describing how Section 6 of the NLRA is “un-
questionably sufficient to authorize the rule at issue in this case”). 
 142. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974). 
 143. Section 104’s effective date has been delayed indefinitely. See 29 
C.F.R. § 104 (2013). 
 144. Id. §§ 101, 102. 
 145. Id.  
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Workers of America v. Beck146 establishing unions’ obligations to 
notify members of their financial and membership obligations 
under labor agreements with union security clauses.147 Like-
wise, rulemaking efforts to capture NLRB precedent establish-
ing a presumption in favor of single location units also failed.148 
Both proposed rules crumbled under the weight of strong oppo-
sition from interested groups.149 Unions opposed the higher no-
tice and disclosure requirements imposed by the Beck holding 
and, by putting intense political pressure on the Board, were 
able to discourage the NLRB from promulgating a final rule.150 
The second rulemaking attempt, which would have classified 
single locations of multi-location entities as independent bar-
gaining units, was opposed by employers and conservative 
members of Congress, who believed that the rule would unfair-
ly favor unions by making formation of bargaining units easi-
er.151 Congress successfully killed the proposed rule by attach-
ing a rider to the NLRB budget appropriation bills in 1996, 
1997, and 1998 prohibiting the Board from spending any of its 
budgets on promulgating the rule.152
The NLRB’s recent attempts at rulemaking on both proce-
dural and substantive issues have also failed primarily because 
of ongoing challenges relating to Board action without a quor-
um. On May 14, 2012, so-called “quickie election rules” were 
struck down by the District Court for the D.C. Circuit because 
the Board lacked a quorum when it voted to adopt the rule, and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit subsequently 
dismissed the Board’s appeal of that decision pursuant to a 
  
 
 146. 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
 147. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,637 (1992). The 
proposed rule was withdrawn four years later in favor of case-by-case adjudi-
cation. See Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of Communications 
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); 61 Fed. Reg. 11,167 (Mar. 19, 1996) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 102). 
 148. See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in 
Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (Sept. 28, 1995). The proposal was 
ultimately withdrawn in 1998. See Rules Regarding Standardized Remedial 
Provisions in Board Unfair Labor Practice Decisions and the Appropriateness 
of Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 63 Fed. Reg. 
8890, 8891 (Feb. 23, 1998) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102). 
 149. See Tuck, supra note 134, at 1135–40 (describing political opposition 
to the NLRB’s substantive rulemaking efforts). 
 150. See id. at 1139. 
 151. See id. at 1136. 
 152. See Flynn, supra note 100, at 501–02 n.152. 
  
2014] LESS IS MORE 1911 
 
joint stipulation of the parties.153 In February, 2014, the Board 
republished the election rules, which seems certain to lead to a 
new round of litigation over the coming years. Additionally, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck the Board’s 
NLRA employee rights notice rule on May 7, 2013, finding that 
it violated Sections 8(b) and 8(c) of the Act.154 The notice rule 
was later also rejected by the Court of Appeals for the fourth 
Circuit on lack of quorum and other grounds in Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States v. NLRB. The court stated that 
“[t]here is no general grant of power to the NLRB outside the 
roles of addressing [unfair labor practice] charges and conduct-
ing representation elections. . . . Indeed, there is no function or 
responsibility of the Board not predicated upon the filing of an 
unfair labor practice charge or a representation petition.”155
Beyond formal rulemaking, every year, the Board’s Gen-
eral Counsel issues numerous enforcement guidance memoran-
da that, while not constituting broad policy guidance, provide 
notice of the enforcement position the GC will take under the 
NLRA.
  
156 Finally, in some areas the NLRB has been prolific in 
the issuance of procedural interpretive rules and directives and 
bargaining unit summary guidance.157
 
 153. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28–29 
(D.D.C. 2012).  
  
 154. National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 155. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 
154, 160 (4th Cir. 2013). In spite of these losses, on August 30, 3013, the 
NLRB launched a mobile app for iPhones and Androids providing, “employers, 
employees and unions with information regarding their rights and obligations 
under the National Labor Relations Act.” National Labor Relations Board 
Launches Mobile App, NLRB OFF. PUB. AFF. (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.nlrb 
.gov/news-outreach/news-story/national-labor-relations-board-launches-mobile 
-app (last viewed Apr. 1, 2014).  
 156. See, e.g., General Counsel Memos, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/reports 
-guidance/general-counsel-memos (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (providing links to 
all general counsel memos). 
 157. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board, An Outline of Law and Pro-
cedure in Representation Cases (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/representation_case_ 
outline_of_law_4-16-13.pdf (providing Agency staff and labor-management 
community with representation case issues); National Labor Relations Board 
Casehandling Manual, Part One, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings (Dec. 
2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic 
-page/node-1727/Final%20ULP%202013%20_1.pdf (providing procedural and 
operational guidance for the Agency’s Regional Directors and their staffs when 
making decisions as to unfair labor practice and representation matters under 
the National Labor Relations Act); National Labor Relations Board 
Casehandling Manual, Part Three, Compliance Proceedings (Nov. 2013), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/ 
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3. Rulemaking Under Title VII. 
Congress did not grant authority to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) when Title VII was enacted 
to write legislative rules. Under Title VII, the EEOC is only au-
thorized to, “issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regu-
lations to carry out” Title VII’s requirements.158 Thus, the 
Commission has promulgated “Procedural Regulations” as set 
out in 29 C.F.R. Part 1601 while, in contrast, its’ remaining Ti-
tle VII regulations encompass non-binding advisory standards 
formulated as “Guidelines”159 that lack the force of law but are 
entitled to deference.160
4. Limiting NLRB Rulemaking Authority to Procedural and 
Non-Binding Interpretive Rules 
  
NLRB adjudicatory rulemaking has been the subject of 
strong Supreme Court criticism at times.161
 
node-1727/CHMIII-2013.pdf (providing procedural and operational guidance 
for compliance proceedings); National Labor Relations Board Casehandling 
Manual, Part Two Representation Proceedings (Aug. 2007), available at http:// 
www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/chm2.pdf 
(providing procedural and operational guidance to Agent’s in representation 
proceedings); National Labor Relations Board Section 10(j) Manual (redacted) 
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
basic-page/node-1727/redacted_10j_manual_5.0_reduced.pdf) (providing pro-
cedural and operational guidance for Agent’s for processing Section 10(j) cas-
es); Office of the General Counsel, NLRB, Guide for Hearing Officers in NLRB 
Representation and Section 10(K) Proceedings (Sept. 2003), available at http:// 
www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1727/hearing_ 
officers_guide.pdf (providing hearing officers with instruction on conducting 
postelection hearings). 
 The Supreme Court 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012). In contrast, under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, the Commission 
has authority to make legislative rules. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (ADEA) 
(“[T]he [EEOC] may issue such rules and regulations as it may consider neces-
sary or appropriate . . . .”).  
 159. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 (2010) (describing EEOC Guidelines on 
Discrimination because of Sex); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1605 (2010) (describing EEOC 
Guidelines on Discrimination because of Religion); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1606 (describ-
ing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination because of National Origin); 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1607 (describing EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures).  
 160. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 n.20 (1976) (per 
curiam), superseded by statute, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 
Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 88 (1983).  
 161. See e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 
374 (1998) (stating that the NLRB applied a “rule of primary conduct . . . dif-
ferent from the rule . . . formally announced"). 
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has harshly criticized the NLRB for its adjudication decision-
making.162 Rulemaking is, “a potential remedy for . . . un-
checked abusive bureaucratic discretion.”163 Rules establish 
reasonable parameters on the exercise of administrative discre-
tion and create certainty. In order for extant law as it has 
heaved to and fro over the last few administrations to avoid be-
coming black letter law, we propose, as under Title VII, that 
NLRA Section 6 be amended to limit NLRB rulemaking author-
ity to procedural and interpretive rules.164
Rulemaking—even interpretive rulemaking—creates more 
certainty for stakeholders. Even with interpretive rulemaking, 
the agency is less likely to actively reverse prior guidance, be-
cause doing so would require it to provide a transparent expla-
nation for its policy shifts in amending a rule if it aims to main-
tain judicial deference.
  
165
Interpretive rules should be promulgated based on extant 
NLRB law and continue to be promulgated in that manner. The 
agency, as subject matter expert on the substantive law, would 
provide important but not binding guidance for employers, em-
ployees, and unions with rules on which they could generally 
rely (but would not be binding) until judicial review. Presuma-
bly the courts would give greater deference to longstanding 
NLRB precedent, such as rules on solicitation and distribu-
tion,
 At the same time the agency can offer 
valuable policy guidance to parties.  
166 but more carefully scrutinize rules that more recently 
expand existing law, such as the agency’s expansion of solicita-
tion rights to vendor/contractor employees.167
 
 162. See id. 
 Preceding NLRB 
 163. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 128, at 32 (“[O]ur . . . systems are 
saturated with excessive discretionary power which needs to be confined, 
structured, checked” (quoting Davis in Discretionary Power)). 
 164. As the Board’s recent experience with its’ employee NLRA rights post-
er reflects, even if we supported notice and comment rulemaking it would like-
ly practically gridlock the agency. See Tuck, supra note 134, at 1121 (arguing 
that “political divisions and intervention from the judiciary and from Con-
gress” make notice and comment rulemaking “not feasible at the NLRB”). 
“Since the NLRB has rarely used rulemaking for substantive policy issues, 
parties would likely challenge the legitimacy of any proposed rule.” Id. at 1129 
(footnotes omitted). 
 165. See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
893, 930, 935–36 (2004) (“It is hard to see why an agency would have less of a 
duty to adhere to—or explain when it wishes to depart from—a policy position 
announced in a nonlegislative rule.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Our Way Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 411 (1983) (establishing 
time parameters of lawful solicitation and distribution rules). 
 167. See, e.g., New York New York, LLC, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 9–10 (2011) 
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decisional law not addressed in newly issued guidance or con-
flicting with such guidance would be of no force or effect other 
than as relevant grounds upon which a reviewing court could 
decide whether the Act has been violated, but that would not 
rise even to the level of required deference upon review.  
Reliance on interpretive rules would avoid judicial inter-
ference, as there would be no need to stay a rule that is adviso-
ry in nature only.168 Congressional initiatives to overturn an in-
terpretive rule or policy statement would likely be virtually 
non-existent in comparison to binding legislative rules. Inter-
pretive rules would also effect savings in areas involving issues 
that arise over and over and over again, and likely avoid the 
unnecessary delays the Board is known for, and that are inher-
ent in notice-and-comment rulemaking, as interpretive rules 
would be valid immediately after Federal Register publica-
tion.169
  CONCLUSION   
 
This article challenges a prevailing view that collective 
representation laws are the Titanic, and that attempts to fix 
them are rearranging the deck chairs.170
 
(expanding solicitation rights to contractors). 
 Prior reform attempts 
have been unsuccessful because they were motivated either by 
partisan politics, or were results-oriented, or both. The long list 
of attempts to fix a broken system should not lead one to con-
clude that the system is unfixable. Nor should it lead one to 
conclude that it is not worth it to attempt to amend the glaring 
problems in this arena. However, it is clear that much work 
needs to be done. Nothing will be accomplished in a climate 
presupposing partisan motivation for change. Rather, we be-
lieve all stakeholders recognize at some level that the federal 
labor law enforcement ship is sinking and that it benefits no 
one to turn that ship into something that benefits one set of po-
larized interest groups over another. This is unfortunate be-
cause it creates an unnecessary barrier to meaningful reform. 
 168. Tuck, supra note 134, at 1146 (explaining that while non-binding poli-
cy statements can be subject to judicial review during an enforcement action, 
there is generally no pre-enforcement judicial review delaying immediate en-
forcement). 
 169. Id. at 1132 n.118 (arguing that interpretive rulemaking would avoid 
“lengthy” notice-and-comment process and expensive litigation). 
 170. See, e.g., Piore & Safford, supra note 29, at 321 (discussing the wide-
spread acceptance that the New Deal system of collective bargaining has col-
lapsed). 
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While it occurs on a macro level because political interest 
groups reactively devalue171
Sadly, this problem might be unavoidable. Paradoxically, it 
could be that the more one tries to present neutral ideas, the 
more they will be ascribed as non-neutral, and perhaps worse, 
the more likely they will be coopted by a non-neutral political 
source and used for non-neutral ends. It may be that no matter 
how neutral one wants to be, tries to be, or is, that it is una-
voidable that non-neutral political leaning motives will be as-
cribed and coopted in this way. Sarat and Silbey aptly describe 
the “pull” of neutral well-intentioned policy recommendations 
for unwanted political ends.
 any proposal set forth by their op-
ponents, it occurs on a micro level as well, when academics and 
commentators immediately cast proposals as either “pro-
management” or “pro-labor” based on criteria independent of 
the merits. Dichotomization and reactive devaluation of pro-
posals that do not emanate from a homophilous source reduce 
the chances of meaningful reform.  
172 They write, “[p]olicy oriented 
work which intends to be silent about its politics speaks none-
theless.”173
The authors’ hope (perhaps too ambitious and optimistic) is 
to break this vicious cycle of failure of reforms in labor law be-
cause of non-neutral ascription or motivation. By adopting a 
perspective of administrative neutrality and focusing on proce-
dural efficiency, we have attempted to craft a proposal that is 
genuinely workable as a reform effort. On the net, the hope is 
to restore credibility to the Board, which it so badly needs, and 
to harmonize the NLRB’s structural enforcement mechanisms 
with similarly situated governmental agencies. The net results 
would benefit management and labor alike. Most importantly, 
the net results would benefit employees and taxpayers in sig-
  
 
 171. “Reactive devaluation” is a term used by social psychologists. See Lee 
Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution, in 27 
MARK ZANNA, ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 270 (vol. 27, 
1995). It describes individuals’ deflation of their valuations of offers made by 
their counterparts in a negotiation, on the spurious assumption that a coun-
terpart’s proposal in her best interest is invariably contra the individual’s best 
interest. Id. There is a substantial body of research on reactive valuation. See 
id. at 255–304; Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict 
Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26–42 (Kenneth J. Arrow 
et al. eds., 1995); Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolu-
tion, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389–404 (1991).  
 172. See Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 
10 LAW & POL’Y 97, 122–32 (1988). 
 173. Id. at 142. 
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nificant ways by increasing administrative efficiency, reducing 
uncertainty in the law, and by augmenting transparency of rule 
making. Perhaps even if Sarat and Silbey are right about the 
paradoxical cooptation of this kind of proposal, one way to avoid 
the serious negative consequences is to focus as we do on struc-
tural and procedural reforms that potentially benefit all par-
ties. At least that is our genuine hope. 
 
